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1. Introduction 
Variability of output, often referred to as production risk, is inherent in marine fisheries 
susceptible to changing environmental conditions. Risk plays an important role in input 
use decisions. Input quantities not only determine the volume of output produced but 
some of these inputs also affect the extent of production risk. In this paper we address the 
implications of production risk for controlling fishing effort in a regulated fishery in a 
framework where fishers maximize expected utility of profit. We focus on controlling 
effort through season closures that limit the number of days the fishery is open to harvest 
each year. 
Risk attitudes of economic agents are an important factor in input allocation 
decisions and hence in output produced (see, for example, Stiglitz (1974), Just and Pope 
(1978), Antle (1987)). Risk considerations are necessary in the analysis of the fishery 
sector as there exist a number of possible cases where policy formulation should consider 
not only the marginal contribution of input use to the mean of output, but also the 
marginal reduction in the variance or higher moments of output. To this end, we 
investigate fishers’ behaviour toward production risk, their input choices and the 
respective effects on output, and discuss the policy implications of production risk for 
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regulating a fishery through controlling season length. In particular we consider fishers’ 
capacity choice and fishing effort, approximated by the number of days at sea. 
 Despite the uncertainty inherent to the fishing industry, the theoretical articles that 
address the choice of fishing effort and capital inputs in fisheries largely assume away 
uncertainty. Gordon (1954), Scott (1955) and others have shown that open access to 
fisheries results in effort levels that result in overharvesting and dissipation of economic 
rents. Clark, Clarke and Munro (1979) were the first to explicitly account for optimal 
investment in fleet capital. McKelvey (1985, 1986) studied the capital investment 
decisions of an individual fisher operating in an open access fishery, and showed that 
open access results in excessive capital investment as compared to the optimal 
management scenario. Homans and Wilen (1997) studied the regulated open access case, 
where TACs are in place in order to conserve the fish stock but no effective attempts are 
made to control the fleet size. They showed that economic overfishing will emerge in the 
regulated open access fishery as well.   
The issue of overfishing and overcapitalisation demonstrated by the above 
research is caused by misguided incentives arising from the absence of well-defined 
property rights. The problem could thus be expected to persist in models explicitly 
including uncertainty in the analysis of the regulator’s and individual fishers’ optimal 
effort and capital choice. However the extent of the discrepancy between the individually 
and socially optimal choices may depend on the uncertainty characterizing the industry as 
well as on the fishers’ risk preferences. In order to steer fisheries towards efficient input 
use, policies aiming at controlling fishing effort or fishing capacity should take into 
account the uncertainty inherent to fisheries, fishers’ risk preferences and the effect of 
controls on both expected profit and on higher moments of profits.  
Individual transferable quotas have been shown to be an optimal instrument for 
regulating fisheries in that they effectively define property rights and thereby correct the 
incentives of individual fishers (Clark 1980, Anderson 1992). In spite of this suboptimal 
instruments such as season closures, input restrictions and limited entry restrictions are 
used in many fisheries. In addition to being an economically suboptimal instrument, 
season closures add risk in the fishery in that openings may occur during extreme weather 
conditions, such as storms. As season closures are regardless of these shortcomings 
widely used as a regulatory instrument, we focus on the effect of season closures on 
fishers’ input choice when fishers’ production risk behaviour is explicitly accounted for. 
Early studies involving the estimation of production functions in order to establish 
a relationship between inputs and outputs in fisheries include, among others, Hannesson 
(1983), Squires (1987), Pascoe and Robinson (1998) and Campbell and Lindner (1990). 
More recently, interest in technical efficiency has driven a shift towards the estimation of 
production frontiers.1 These were estimated using Data Envelopment Analysis (DAE), 
which allows the study of technical and allocative inefficiency. Relevant studies include 
Pascoe, Coglan and Mardle (2001), Tingley, Pascoe and Mardle (2003) and Vestergaard, 
and Squires and Kirkley (2003). However, as DAE is non-parametric, it is sensitive to 
random error, and also does not provide estimates of the impact of individual inputs on 
the level of outputs, or the relationship between the outputs themselves. To overcome 
these shortcomings, a number of papers estimate stochastic production frontiers for 
fisheries; see for example, Kirkley, Squires and Strand (1995, 1998), Grafton, Squires 
and Fox (2000) and Pascoe and Coglan (2002). Stochastic production frontiers account 
for the possible influence of data noise, arising from measurement error or model 
misspecification, upon the shape and positioning of the frontier. Estimating these 
frontiers involves the specification of a frontier function with an error term with two 
components: a symmetric error to account for noise and an asymmetric error to account 
for inefficiency. All of these studies neglect uncertainty and risk.2 
In the general production function literature the impact of the choice of inputs on 
production risk has been studied more extensively. The traditional theoretical studies 
implicitly assume that inputs increase risk. Examples of such studies are Stiglitz (1974), 
Batra (1974) and Bardhan (1977). These studies utilised multiplicative stochastic 
specifications, which are restrictive in the sense that inputs that marginally reduce risk are 
not allowed. Just and Pope (1978) identified this limitation and proposed a more general 
stochastic specification of the production function. Their model includes two general 
functions: one which specifies the effects of inputs on the mean of output, and another 
one which determines the effects on its variance, thus allowing inputs to be either risk-
increasing or risk-decreasing.  
While Just and Pope's model is a generalization of the traditional model in that it 
does not restrict the effects of inputs on the variance to be related to the mean, Antle 
(1983, 1987) has shown that it does restrict the effects of inputs across the second and 
higher moments in exactly the way traditional econometric models do across all 
moments. Thus Antle's departure point was to establish a set of less restrictive general 
conditions under which standard econometric techniques can be used to identify and 
estimate risk attitude parameters as part of a structural econometric model. More 
specifically, Antle's moment-based approach begins with a general parameterisation of 
the moments of the probability distribution of output, which allows the identification of 
risk parameters for more flexible representations of output distributions. Moreover, 
Antle's approach places the emphasis on the distribution of risk attitudes in the 
population, which constitutes a departure from existing literature which focuses on 
measurement of the risk attitudes of the individual producer (see for example Hazell, 
1982; Pope, 1982; and Binswanger, 1982). 
Love and Buccola (1991, 1999) also proposed an extension of Just and Pope’s 
model including producers’ attitude toward risk in the model. They assumed an implicit 
form of the utility function and considered producers’ risk preferences in a joint analysis 
of input allocation and output supply decisions. Just and Pope’s work has also been 
extended in a series of studies on salmon farming. Kumbhakar (2002a) examines joint 
estimation of production and risk preference functions in the presence of production risk 
and output price uncertainty, using a quadratic specification for the production and utility 
functions.3  In another recent study by Kumbhakar (2002b) risk preference functions are 
derived without assuming an explicit form of the utility function and any distribution of 
the error term representing production risk. Two sources of risk, namely production 
uncertainty and technical efficiency, are considered. Kumbhakar and Tveterås (2003) use 
a system approach to simultaneously estimate production risk, risk preferences and firm 
heterogeneity. Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2002) use a nonparametric approach to estimate 
the production function, the risk function and risk preference function associated with 
production risk, thereby avoiding the need to specify a functional form for either the 
production or risk functions.4   
All of the above studies use the Just and Pope specification in the sense that they 
do not allow for the identification of the effect of inputs on the higher moments of output. 
In this study instead we apply Antle´s (1983, 1987) moment based approach, which 
enables estimation of the stochastic production function and fishers’ risk attitudes without 
any ad hoc specification of the form of the risk preferences. We study stochastic 
production, input choice and fishers’ risk attitudes in the North Sea Fishery. The 
extensive requirements in terms of functional form specification of the various 
distributions (stochastic production function, risk function, utility function under risk) 
involved in the analytical solution of the model lead us to attempt an empirical 
approximation to this model. Antle's flexible moment-based approach readily lends itself 
to estimating the empirical approximation. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the underlying model 
of fishers’ behaviour under risk and discuss implications of risk aversion for policies that 
regulate inputs. The empirical model is described in section 3. The model is applied to an 
unbalanced panel from the North Sea Fishery. The relevant data-set is described in 
section 4 and estimation results in terms of derived input-specific risk attitude 
characteristics (absolute Arrow-Pratt and down-side risk aversion coefficients and risk 
premium) are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper by discussing the 
impact of regulating inputs in a stochastic fishery in terms of input use and moments of 
profit, and the policy implications of such regulations.  
 
 
2. Theoretical Model: Fishers’ Behaviour under Risk. 
 
In this section we analyse the impact of season closures on the production decisions of a 
fisher operating in a risky environment. The model of the fishery we employ is 
necessarily a seasonal one. We follow Homans and Wilen (1997) and assume that vessel 
capital is non-malleable only on an intra-seasonal basis.5 Our focus here is on inputs 
whose choice and mixture may be modified by the fisher on a seasonal basis in order to 
hedge against production risk. Fishers are assumed price-takers, so that a modification in 
their input allocation decision will affect neither output nor input prices.  
Assume a management authority regulates the fishery and limits season length in 
the fishery. An economically optimal management strategy would entail choosing both 
the capital utilization and the resource investment policy simultaneously in order to 
maximize the expected utility of harvest over time. As long as property rights to the 
resource stock are not well defined, individual fishers have an incentive to expend effort 
in excess of the socially optimal levels. Season closures are used to limit effort in 
fisheries even though they have been shown to be inefficient in economic literature (see 
for example Clark 1990, Homans and Wilen 1997). In reality season length is often 
limited based on biological stock conservation objectives rather than economic 
considerations. Neglecting risk consequences may have unforeseen consequences both in 
terms of meeting the conservation goals of regulations and the economic performance of 
the industry.  
An important aspect of our framework is that from the fishers’ point of view the 
season length restriction is exogenous, so that once it is chosen, fishers decide on their 
production plans considering the season length as given. Both problems (choice of season 
length and decision on the level of production) are thus completely separated. This is 
because the management authority’s criterion is based upon the whole resource stock and 
the entire fishing fleet, whereas each fisher only considers his individual expected utility 
and is too small to influence the agency's decision. 
 
A key ingredient to assessing accurately the performance of such resource management 
policy is naturally studying the fishers’ input choices and their effect on harvest under 
such a policy. This requires first, an adequate representation of the technology, but also 
of fishers preferences towards risk. 
 
It is well known that ignoring possible distortions in production decisions due to risk 
aversion can lead to misleading results (Just and Pope, 1978; Aigner et al., 1977; 
Griffiths and Anderson, 1982). When production risk originating for example from 
climatic or ecological conditions is likely to be significant, producers may hedge against 
risk by modifying their input choices. Stochastic factors such as extreme weather 
conditions and variation in the size and distribution of the fish stock make the production 
process in marine capture fisheries risky. There is however considerable scope for 
controlling the level of output risk through input quantities. For example the effect of 
labour quality such as crew skill and experience may be important, since production 
outcomes depend on measures taken by the crew as a response to changing weather 
conditions and other environmental variation. Further large vessels are less susceptible to 
bad weather.  
 
The production model 
 
In this section, the basic representative agent production model under risk is developed. 
As noted above, we assume an exogenously-given season length whose determination is 
not detailed here. 
 
Let p  denote output price for a single composite output,  is the production function, (.)f
X  is the K vector of inputs, and r  is the corresponding vector of unit input prices. We 
approximate fishing effort by days at sea. The season length restriction is directed 
towards this single input. We denote days at sea by  with associated unit price . We 
then have  and 
DX
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where DX  is a restriction in absolute terms. We assume that there exists a single source 
of risk affecting production yield, denoted ε , whose distribution  is not affected by 
fisher’s actions (weather conditions and the like). In addition, we assume prices 
(.)G
p  and r  
to be non random, so that the only source of risk is production risk through the random 
variable ε . Let us suppose further that  is continuous and twice differentiable. The 
representative agent’s problem is to maximize expected profit if she is risk-neutral, or to 
maximize the expected utility of profit if she is risk-averse, subject to condition [1]. In 
the latter case, the agent's problem is  
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where  is the Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function and U(.) λ  is the Lagrange 
multiplier associated with [1]. The optimal solution for action X  would then depend 
upon (  and on the shape of functions ,  and . The first-order condition 
associated with this problem for the fishing effort represented by days at sea  is: 
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because p  and  are not random, and where Dr ππ ∂∂=′ )(UU . It is apparent that the 
shape of the utility function (whose curvature is increasing with the degree of absolute 
risk aversion) will determine the magnitude of the departure from the risk-neutrality case. 
For a risk-neutral fisher, the price ratio under the season closure policy, 
( )[ ]E(1 Urp D )′+ λ  equals the expected marginal productivity of . When the fisher is 
risk averse, the second term in the right-hand side of [3] is different from 0, and measures 
deviations from the risk-neutrality case. More precisely, this term is proportional and has 
the opposite sign, to the marginal risk premium with respect to . If the latter is risk 
increasing, the marginal risk premium increases with  and the desired level of that 
input decreases, all other things being equal.  
DX
DX
DX
 
 
3. Empirical Model: Assessing Risk Attitudes  
 
In principle, solving Equation [3] for  yields the equilibrium fishing effort in terms of DX
p , r , CX  and λ . owever, the problem is empirically difficult. In addition to the choice 
of production function specification, the distribution of 
 H
ε  needs to be known and the 
agent’s preferences need to be specified through the utility function. We thus choose a 
flexible approach that has the advantage of requiring only information on profit, price and 
input quantities. The key feature of this approach is to note that the solution to the 
fisher’s problem can be written as a function of input levels alone. More precisely, 
maximizing the expected utility of profit with respect to any input, subject to the season 
length restriction, is equivalent to maximizing a function of moments of the distribution 
of ε , those moments having themselves X  as an argument. There is no loss of generality 
here, because such function of the moments, denoted , is completely unspecified. 
The fisher's program becomes: 
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where , ..., m,jj 21 , =μ  is the  moment of profit. thm
 
Based on the expression above, Antle (1983, 1987) proposes a moment-based approach 
to estimate risk-attitude parameters of a population of producers. Focusing on the 
population instead of focusing on each individual agent has two main advantages. It 
avoids any problem of aggregation of individuals and allows the identification of the risk-
attitude parameters from a cross-sectional dataset. However, this approach relies on some 
assumptions. First, the agent solves a single-period maximisation program in which 
inputs are predetermined variables. Second, all agents harvest with similar technology. 
Below, this stochastic technology is represented by the corresponding distribution of 
profit, which amounts to assuming that the same profit distribution applies to each fisher 
and that all fishers form the same expectations. We now describe more precisely Antle's 
method. From the first order condition, in matrix form: 
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As before we index the inputs used in harvesting by Kk ,...,1=  and we denote by jkα  the 
expression ( ) ( ))()()()( 1 XXFXXF j μμ ∂∂∂∂ . jkα , ),...,m2( j =  represents the  
average population risk attitude parameter related to input . For each input , we will 
thus have  unknown parameters. Each of the 
thj
k k
)1( −m K  equations described below will be 
estimated separately. 
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The marginal contribution of input k  to the expected profit is given by kXX ∂∂ )(1μ , 
which is written as a linear combination of the marginal contributions of input k  to the 
other moments (variance: kXX ∂∂ )(2μ , skewness: kXX ∂∂ )(3μ , ...). mkα  measures the 
“weight” attributed by the fisher to the  moment of his profit distribution. The 
analysis is made input by input because each input contributes in a different manner to 
the moments of the profit distribution. In general, we expect that all inputs increase the 
expected profit but, for the second and higher-order moments, we can find risk-increasing 
as well as risk-decreasing inputs.  
thm
 
The following model will be estimated for each input k :6 
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where  )!1( ..., ),!31( ),!21( 3322 mmkmkkkkk ×−=×−=×−= αθαθαθ and  is the usual 
econometric error term. A nice feature of this model is that the parameters 
ku
k2θ  and k3θ  
are directly interpretable as Arrow-Pratt and down-side risk aversion coefficients 
respectively. Arrow-Pratt  absolute risk aversion coefficient is defined by: )(AP
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A positive AP  coefficient means that the fisher is risk-averse. Down-side  risk 
aversion is measured by: 
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A positive  coefficient means that the fisher is averse to down-side risk.DS 7 AP  and 
 coefficients can then be used to compute the risk premium DS RP . Assuming that the 
fisher is concerned about the first three moments of the distribution only, we have 
62
kAP − 32 kDSμμ=RP  for each , where k 2μ  and 3μ  are respectively a measure of the 
second- and third-order moments of the distribution.  would mean that the fisher 
is characterized by a positive willingness to pay to be insured against the risk associated 
with the use of input . Coefficients 
0fkRP
k k2α  and k3α , directly related to  and , can 
also be interpreted as a measure of the marginal contribution of each moment to the risk 
premium. 
kAP kDS
 
4. Description of the Data-Set: The North Sea Fishery 
 
The North Sea is the major fishing area in European Community waters. Commercial 
activity in the region is mostly undertaken by fishermen from the UK, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, France, Germany, Belgium and Norway. Transboundary stocks are shared 
between the EU and Norway.  The total value of the allowable catch in 1999 was 
estimated to be about 1.5 billion Euro. This is an underestimate of the true value of 
landings as the guide prices are generally lower than market prices. However, it provides 
an indication of the order of magnitude of the value of the fishery.   
 
This study focuses on two main fleet segments that make up the majority of the UK 
North Sea fleet; one composed of mobile and the other composed of static vessels. Most 
of the stocks exploited by the fleet are heavily over-fished. In addition, the fishery has 
been targeted for decommissioning as it is considered to have considerable excess 
capacity. Fleet size has been almost halved between 1994 and 2000 as a result of the 
reduced North Sea quotas, pushing some boats into the English Channel and/or Celtic 
Sea, and decommissioning. 
 
Despite being subject to quota controls, the quotas were not binding over the period 
examined. Since the introduction of the FQAs in 1999, the only binding quotas for North 
Sea species were for saithe and sole in 2000. For most species, quota uptake ranged 
between 70 and 90 per cent (DEFRA). An analysis of the available beam trawl logbook 
and quota allocation data for 2000 found that over 75 per cent of the vessels did not fill 
their quota allocation, with the remainder exceeding the allocation (presumably through 
quota leasing). Given the apparent abundance of quota and the apparent effectiveness of 
the quota leasing market, it was assumed for the purposes of this study that the quotas 
were not effectively constraining output. 
 
Logbook production data and boat characteristics information from the central fleet 
registry for the trawlers operating in the North Sea were used in the analysis. The data is 
an unbalanced panel, including the following years: 1996, 1997, 2000, 2001 for both, the 
static and mobile segments of the fleet. Mobile gears include beam, dredge, otter and 
pelagic gears, while static gears include pots, nets and lines. Tables 1 and 2 present the 
relevant descriptive statistics. 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables: Mobile Vessels 
Variable  Mean Standard Deviation 
Profit 152,731.99 145814.40 
Capital Value 215372.18 222597.88 
Days at sea  206.295 58.60 
Length of the vessel 16.07 7.64 
Engine power (KW) 177.67 170.58 
Age of the vessel 19.71 12.59 
Number of Observations: 167 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables: Static Vessels 
Variable  Mean Standard Deviation 
Profit 54,765.83 90617.43 
Capital value 52,119.46 103764.36 
Days at sea 178.25 65.72 
Length of the vessel 9.38 4.07 
Engine power (KW) 84.09 88.81 
Age of the vessel 16 11.29 
Number of Observations: 269 
 
 
Catches of the key species used in the construction of the profit variable incorporated into 
the model varied over the period examined, largely as a result of changes in stock 
conditions. Accounting for variations in stock abundance in fisheries production 
functions is generally undertaken through either the direct inclusion of the stock, or 
through the use of dummy variables. A particular problem exists for the use of stock 
indexes in multi-output production functions in that each stock measure relates directly to 
only one of the outputs, although indirectly it may affect the output of the others by 
affecting fishing patterns.  A composite stock variable cannot effectively capture the 
stock changes of the different species, which do not follow a consistent pattern. To 
overcome these problems, the catches in each time period were normalized using the 
stock indexes, i.e., the catch in each time period was divided by the stock index in that 
time period. This allows the effects of changes in stock size on catch to be incorporated 
into the analysis, but imposes the implicit assumption of unitary output elasticity with 
respect to stock size. This assumption is most likely valid given the nature of the 
resources, in that they are widely dispersed, fairly uniform in density across their areas of 
distribution and exploited across their whole areas of distribution. 
 
While several physical characteristics of vessels were available in the data set, e.g. 
length, age and engine power (kW); only vessel capital value and days at the sea, the 
latter being the restricted input, were used in the production function estimation. Vessel 
age and engine power, were used as instruments in the last stage of the estimation 
procedure (2SLS). Vessel length was found to be highly correlated with engine power 
(r=0.94) and as a result was excluded from the model. 
  
Since one of the requirements of Antle’s approach is for the agents in the panel to have 
the same production technology, we apply the approach separately to the two samples of 
our panel: the one with the mobile gears and the one with the static gears.  
 
 
5. Econometric estimation and results 
 
Measurement of risk-attitude parameters 
 
Following Antle (1987), we propose to estimate the sample-average risk-attitude 
parameters. As before, we distinguish between two groups of producers, fishers with 
mobile and static vessels, and two inputs, capital value and days at sea. We wish not to 
impose a priori the equality of risk-attitude parameters between the two different inputs. 
For each of the two groups, our estimation methodology is the following: first, we 
estimate the conditional expectation of profit using a quadratic functional form: total 
observed profit is regressed on all levels, squared and cross-products of inputs. The 
residuals of the latter regression are then used to compute conditional higher moments 
(variance and skewness), which are then regressed on all levels, squared and cross 
products of inputs. 
 
Analytical expressions for derivatives of these moments with respect to each input are 
then computed. We finally fit a 2SLS equation of the estimated derivative of the expected 
profit on derivatives for higher moments for each input. Age of vessel and engine power, 
were used as instruments in the 2SLS estimation. The parameters associated with the 
second and third moment will respectively be denoted by k2θ  and k3θ  for each input k . 
Estimated parameters are then used to recover Arrow-Pratt  and down-side (  
risk aversion measures using the following relationships:  and ; 
 These estimates are finally used to compute the average risk premium 
)AP
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ρ kkk DSAP −=  where 2μ  and 3μ  are respectively a measure of the second- and 
third-order moments of the distribution. 
Estimation results for the sub-group of mobile vessels are found in Table 3. The 
Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of equal parameters between the effects of the choice 
of the two inputs. For both inputs, the parameters 2θ  associated with the second moment 
(variance of profit) are positive and significant whereas the parameter linked to the third 
moment is negative and significant. Signs of these coefficients are “as expected”, 
showing risk-aversion of mobile vessel producers (through both the Arrow-Pratt and 
down-side risk measures). The average relative risk-premium is similar across inputs, 
ranging from 17% (for capital) to 20% (for days at sea) of expected profit. 
 
Table 3. Estimation of the risk-aversion measures: mobile vessels 
 Capital Value Days at Sea 
 Est Std Err Est Std Err 
     
Constant -0.0245 0.0715 0.1169 0.0729 
k2θ  1.2726 0.4159 2.1143 0.2139 
k3θ  -0.5222 0.6936 -0.6346 0.8011 
   
     
AP  2.55 0.83 4.23 0.43 
   
DS  3.13 4.16 3.81 4.81 
RP  17% 17% 
 
ald test of parameters equality: 1771.0 (p-value: 0.0000). 
esults for the static vessels sub-group are reported in Table 4. The Wald test rejects the 
able 4. Estimation of the risk-aversion measures: static vessels 
W
 
 
R
null of parameter equality with regards to effects of these two inputs on expected profit. 
The parameter linked to the variance is positive and significant in both models. Thus, we 
get positive Arrow-Pratt risk aversion measures for both capital and days at sea inputs. 
Moreover the down-side risk measure is positive and significant for both inputs. The 
relative risk premia are lower in the static vessels group (7% and 9%, for capital and days 
at the sea, respectively) compared to the group of mobile vessels.  
 
T
 Capital Value Days at Sea 
 E rr Est rr st Std E Std E
     
constant 0.1 3 0.0400 0.1432 0.0222 43
k2θ  0.8595 0.1672 7.8820 0.7078 
k3θ  -1.4992 0.4680 -20.7043 
   
2.0907 
     
AP  1.72 0.33 15.76 1.42 
DS  9.00 2.81 124.23 12.54 
   
7% 9% RP  
Wa  test of parameters equality: 1570.3 (p-value: 0.0000). 
e note that the constant term is not significant in either of the two models. We know 
olicy Implications 
his paper dealt with estimation of the production technology and input choice decisions, 
ur results show that, firstly, fishermen are risk averse. Secondly, failure to include risk 
and are thus less susceptible to variation in the harvest yield.   
ld
 
 
W
that by definition we should not observe a significant constant term in the model linking 
the derivatives of moments of expected profit with respect to each input (see Equation 
[7]). A significant constant term indicates model misspecification, or that the input under 
consideration is inefficiently used and more precisely, a positive [resp. negative] sign 
means that the input under consideration is overused [resp. underused] in the sense that 
the expected marginal return is less [resp. greater] than the factor price. Our result 
indicates correct model specification and no production inefficiency. 
 
 
P
 
T
when producer’s face exogenous production risk. We estimated the production 
technology and risk preferences using Antle's flexible moment-based approach on data 
from the North Sea Fishery.  
 
O
aversion behavior in the characterization of the production function might bias parameter 
estimates and give wrong results on technological parameters. Thirdly, risk aversion 
behavior is translated in terms of risk premium, which is viewed as the implicit cost of 
private risk bearing. Risk premium as a percentage of mean profit is found to be different 
between mobile and static gears, with mobile gears exhibiting higher premia by 10% and 
8% of profit, for capital and days at the sea inputs, respectively. Fishers using static gears 
(pots, lines and nets) involving smaller fixed costs often have other sources of income 
 As shown in section 2 of the paper, if fishers are risk averse, the value of the marginal 
roduct of variable inputs exceeds their market price. This result might be used to argue 
eferences 
nd L. Orea, (2001). Different Approaches to Model Multi-Species Fisheries 
sing a Primal Approach', Efficiency Series Paper 3/2001, Department of Economics, 
sideration of the potential use of individual transferable quotas in 
S fisheries, Vol. 1: Overview Document, Report prepared for the National Oceanic and 
cture of Production: A Flexible Moment-
ased Approach. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics. 1, 192-201. 
rican Journal 
f Agricultural Economics. 509-522. 
rms of Tenancy in a Peasant Economy. Journal of 
evelopment Economy. 4, 105-118. 
 
p
(erroneously) that vessels are not efficient in allocating their variable inputs and that 
regulation regarding input choices is needed to enhance the economic performance of the 
fishery. Furthermore neglecting risk considerations when assessing impacts of regulation 
policies on input choices and expected harvest could provide misleading guidance to 
policy makers concerned about sustainable harvest levels. This is a significant piece of 
warning to all policy makers that contemplate regulation of stochastic production process 
in general, and fisheries, in particular.  
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 There are also theoretical reasons why the estimation of production frontiers has advantages over the 
e measure of output. However, unlike many 
 the 
1
estimation of production functions (see Kumbhakar, 2002). 
2 A common feature of these studies is the reliance on a singl
other industries, fisheries are characterised by joint production. Multi-output distance functions in fisheries 
have been studied by Alvarez and Orea (2001), Fousekis (2002) and Bjørndal, Koundouri and Pascoe 
(2003), who examine the implications of output substitution in multispecies fisheries for quota setting. 
3 Kumbhakar considers an exogenous production shock rather than input dependent production risk in
sense of Just and Pope. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
k1
4 However, non-parametric estimations involve the selection of the kernel and bandwidth, which are not 
specification free. 
5 This assumption is a reasonable one for a fishery where vessels participating in harvest could be readily 
diverted to other fisheries.  
6 We should check that θ  is not significantly different from zero in each model. 
7 Down-side risk is concerned with asymmetric (skewed) statistical distributions of profit. 
 
